2027 IS NOT 2023 (PART ONE) By Collins Ughalaa -

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2027 IS NOT 2023 (PART ONE)

By Collins Ughalaa

There has been considerable discussion about the 2027 general elections, particularly the outcome of the 2023 presidential election, in which Peter Obi came third with 6,101,533 votes. President Bola Ahmed Tinubu won the election with 8,794,726 votes, defeating his closest rival, Atiku Abubakar, who polled 6,984,520 votes.

Despite the turbulent political environment at the time, Tinubu achieved what many considered impossible and emerged victorious. The All Progressives Congress (APC) has again nominated him as its presidential candidate for the 2027 election. Interestingly, his principal rivals from 2023 have remained politically relevant as the country gradually shifts attention to the next electoral cycle.

To properly understand why the circumstances surrounding the 2027 election are fundamentally different from those of 2023, it is important to revisit the atmosphere in which the last presidential election was conducted. The 2023 election took place against the backdrop of severe security challenges, widespread public anxiety, internal political tensions within the ruling party, and economic disruptions that combined to create one of the most difficult electoral environments in Nigeria’s democratic history.

It was on the night of July 5, 2022 that the Kuje Medium Security Custodial Centre, popularly known as Kuje Prison, came under heavy attack by a group said to be the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), a breakaway faction of Boko Haram. The prison is located in the Kuje Area Council of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. There was pandemonium everywhere following the attack. ISWAP later released a video claiming responsibility.

Reports indicated that about 300 ISWAP fighters used explosives, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and heavy firearms to breach the main entrance and perimeter fence of the prison. They reportedly operated unhindered for nearly three hours. At the end of the attack, one officer of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and four inmates were reportedly killed, 16 inmates reportedly sustained injuries, and approximately 879 inmates, including 64 Boko Haram and terrorism suspects, reportedly escaped. Although reports showed that about 453 inmates were eventually recaptured, the incident remains one of the most embarrassing security breaches in Nigeria’s recent history.

The Kuje prison attack remains the most significant prison attack in Abuja’s history. It occurred only hours after President Muhammadu Buhari’s convoy was reportedly attacked in Katsina State.

Beyond the Kuje prison attack, there were several other security breaches during the Buhari administration, ranging from terrorism and banditry to mass kidnappings, separatist violence, attacks on security formations, and communal conflicts. Suicide bombings and terrorist attacks occurred in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States. ISWAP grew in prominence, and there were repeated reports of military bases being overrun and soldiers killed. The resulting humanitarian crisis led to the displacement of millions of Nigerians.

The country also witnessed a resurgence of mass abductions of students, particularly in northern Nigeria. Major incidents included the Kankara schoolboys’ abduction in Katsina State in 2020, the Kagara school abduction in Niger State in 2021, the Jangebe schoolgirls’ abduction in Zamfara State in 2021, and the Kaduna train attack and abductions in 2022.

Armed bandit groups emerged as a major national security threat, affecting Zamfara, Katsina, Kaduna, Sokoto, Niger States, and even the Federal Capital Territory. Villages were raided, cattle rustled, and mass killings and kidnapping for ransom became commonplace. Violent clashes between farmers and herders also intensified in Benue, Plateau, Kaduna, and Nasarawa States. Many communities were reportedly overrun by non-state actors, and it often appeared that the government was unable to respond effectively.

In the Southeast, rising violence linked to separatist agitation became an everyday reality. Attacks on police stations, the killing of security personnel, and the enforcement of sit-at-home orders became the order of the day. Businesses suffered tremendously, while politicians and politically exposed persons were singled out for gruesome attacks and killings. Under such conditions, campaigning for, or openly associating with, the APC in parts of the Southeast was perceived as a dangerous undertaking. Driving politically branded vehicles, particularly those associated with the APC, was considered risky.

Beyond the security challenges, the APC entered the 2023 presidential election looking like a divided family. There was a visible cold war between President Buhari’s camp and Tinubu’s camp. Reports of delayed funding of party activities, allegedly withheld state structures, and the naira redesign and cash scarcity crisis of January and February 2023 were widely perceived by many Nigerians as acts of sabotage from within the government. Tinubu’s famous “Emi lo kan” speech in Abeokuta was interpreted by many as a direct challenge to powerful forces allegedly working against him.

The 22 APC governors were also perceived as divided. While some were openly supportive of Tinubu, others appeared either quieter or more aligned with Buhari’s camp. The Progressive Governors’ Forum and the APC National Working Committee did not always speak with one voice on campaign strategy. Following the party primaries, several APC members defected, while accusations of anti-party activities surfaced in states such as Kaduna, Zamfara, and Adamawa. Even in Lagos, there were persistent rumours of internal sabotage.

As if these internal divisions and security concerns were not enough, the Buhari administration’s monetary policies were also seen by many as politically damaging to Tinubu’s campaign. Under the leadership of Central Bank Governor Godwin Emefiele, the CBN introduced a controversial naira redesign policy involving the N200, N500, and N1,000 notes and initially set January 31, 2023, as the deadline for old notes to cease being legal tender. Although the deadline was later extended to February 10, Nigerians were already groaning under the policy. New notes were scarce, and withdrawal limits of N100,000 per week for individuals and N500,000 per week for corporate entities were imposed.

The impact on businesses and ordinary Nigerians was severe. ATMs ran dry, banks restricted withdrawals, and citizens queued for hours and sometimes days to access cash. POS operators charged exorbitant fees, while market traders, transport operators, artisans, and others who relied heavily on cash transactions suffered greatly. APC’s traditional support base, namely: market women, traders, artisans, and commercial transport operators, bore the brunt of the policy. There was genuine concern that the party would be punished at the polls for what many described as “Buhari’s hardship.”

This crisis occurred barely two to three weeks before the February 25, 2023, presidential election. Consequently, protests erupted in parts of Ogun, Delta, Oyo, and Edo States, among others. Banks were attacked, and public anger was directed at virtually every symbol of government. It was under these harsh circumstances that the presidential election was conducted. Yet, Tinubu still won. Despite the divisions and widespread public frustration, the APC secured victory with 8.79 million votes and retained most of its states during the March 18 governorship elections.

Lagos provided an interesting example of the impact of the cash crisis. Markets such as Mile 12, Balogun, Alaba, and Computer Village are largely cash-driven economies. When new notes failed to circulate adequately and ATMs became empty, traders and artisans were outraged. Many blamed the APC and Tinubu, even though the policy originated from the Central Bank under Buhari’s administration. Given the economic frustration among traders and other cash-dependent groups, it was unsurprising that the APC narrowly lost Lagos State by a margin of roughly 10,000 votes.

But that was in 2023 under the administration of Muhammadu Buhari, with Godwin Emefiele as Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria and powerful interests within government wielding considerable influence. Under the Tinubu administration, much has changed. Unlike the period when Nigeria appeared to be under siege, security agencies have recorded notable successes, particularly in rescue operations against kidnappers, terrorists, and bandits across different parts of the country.

One of the most significant breakthroughs came in the Northeast, where the Nigerian Army rescued about 360 abducted persons from Boko Haram captivity in Borno State. The operation, carried out in the Mandara Mountains, led to the recovery of many women and children who had been held by insurgents. In another nationwide operational update, the Defence Headquarters disclosed that troops rescued 409 kidnapped victims and arrested more than 300 criminal suspects during coordinated military operations in February 2026. Similarly, the Armed Forces of Nigeria announced that troops neutralised 317 terrorists and rescued 221 kidnapped civilians during coordinated offensives across several states in May 2026.

Security agencies have also intensified intelligence-led rescue missions, aerial surveillance, and search-and-rescue operations aimed at securing the release of abducted victims and dismantling criminal camps. Reports from Borno State further indicated that more than 430 residents abducted by insurgents in Ngoshe, Gwoza Local Government Area, were rescued following sustained military pressure on terrorist enclaves.

Beyond rescue operations, Nigerian troops have recorded successes in degrading terrorist capabilities. Joint operations involving the military, police, intelligence services, and local security networks have reportedly eliminated hundreds of ISWAP fighters and destroyed logistics bases and weapons infrastructure in the North-East. Of special mention is the elimination of the second-in-command of ISWAP, Abu-Bilal al-Monika (also known as Abu-Mainok) by Nigerian security forces, working in coordination with the United States, on May, 16. Abu-Mainok was described as a senior figure in the global Islamic State network.

While insecurity remains a major challenge in parts of the country, recent rescue missions and counterterrorism offensives suggest sustained efforts by security agencies to contain kidnapping, insurgency, and organised criminal QQ violence. Compared with 2022 and early 2023, Abuja no longer appears to be under the level of security pressure that generated widespread fears at the time. Q are q no widely reported cases of Nigerian communities remaining under the sustained control of non-state actors comparable to the situations witnessed in some areas during the Buhari years.

As Nigerians gradually turn their attention to the 2027 g. eneral elections, the political, economic, and security realities differ markedly from those that existed in 2023. These remarkable changes will ultimately shape voter behaviour in the 2027 presidential election.

To be continued…